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Résumé Abstract
Les  conflits  d’intérêts  (CI)  dans  le  contexte  universitaire 
reçoivent une attention croissante, mais l’accent a été en 
grande  partie  sur  les  conflits  d’intérêts  financiers 
problématiques  résultants  des  relations  université-
industrie,  qui  doivent  clairement  être  évités.  Le  résultat, 
malheureusement, est une perception péjorative. En effet, 
ceux-ci sont perçus comme étant de la fraude et donc un 
problème  d’inconduite  académique.  Dans  cet  article, 
l’objectif  est  de  montrer  que  même  si  certains  conflits 
d’intérêts financiers et non financiers sont particulièrement 
problématiques  et  devraient  donc  être  évités,  beaucoup 
sont omniprésents et sont en fait la norme dans le milieu 
universitaire malgré qu’ils soient encore largement ignorés 
et  incompris.  Grâce  à  une  réflexion  sur  ma  propre 
expérience en tant  que professeur  d’université,  je décris 
une diversité de conflits d’intérêts financiers, non financiers 
et institutionnels communs de degrés de risque divers, qui 
se posent dans les activités quotidiennes d’un professeur, 
pour ensuite examiner comment ces CI peuvent et doivent 
être  gérés  dans  la  pratique.  Il  est  essentiel  de  se 
préoccuper de toute la gamme de conflits d’intérêts et de 
réfléchir  à  des  politiques,  des  procédures  ou des lignes 
directrices  appropriées  afin  d’interdire  certains  conflits 
d’intérêts et  atténuer les risques des autres.  Cependant, 
ces  mécanismes  «durs»  ne  sont  qu’une  partie  de  la 
solution.  Ce  document  met  l’accent  sur  l’élucidation  de 
différents  mécanismes  «doux»  -  comme  l’éducation,  la 
conscience  de  soi,  l’humilité  et  le  dialogue  (avec  les 
collègues, étudiants, personnels) - qui peuvent habiliter les 
professeurs à gérer ces conflits d’intérêts, qui ne peuvent 
être empêchés ni évités.
Conflicts  of  interest  (COI)  in  the  university  context  are 
receiving growing attention, but the focus has been largely 
on problematic financial COI arising from university-industry 
relations,  which  clearly  need  to  be  avoided.  The  result, 
unfortunately,  is  a  pejorative perception of  COI as being 
equivalent  to  fraud  and  thus  an  issue  of  academic 
misconduct.  In  this  paper,  the aim is  to  show that  while 
some  financial  and  non-financial  COI  are  particularly 
problematic and so should be avoided, many are pervasive 
and actually  the  norm in  academia  even if  they are still 
largely ignored and misunderstood. Through a reflection on 
my own experiences as a university professor, I describe a 
diversity of common financial, non-financial and institutional 
COI of varying degrees of risk, that arise in the day-to-day 
activities of a professor, in order to then consider how these 
COI can and should be managed in practice. It is essential 
to  attend  to  the  full  range  of  COI  and  to  think  about 
appropriate policies,  procedures,  or guidelines to prohibit 
some COI and mitigate the risks of others; but these “hard” 
mechanisms are only part of the solution. This paper will 
focus on elucidating the various “soft” mechanisms – such 
as education, self-awareness, humility, and dialogue (with 
colleagues, students, staff) – that can empower professors 
to manage those COI that cannot be prevented or avoided.
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Introduction 
The term ‘Professor’ does not denote a formal profession – as would be the case for doctors, lawyers, 
nurses or engineers, for example – so there are no professional codes of ethics as such for university 
professors (even if there may be codes for university staff in general) to guide their behaviour and 
make them publicly and legally accountable should they breach the norms of their profession. While 
some professors are also members of formal professions and thus have professional codes of ethics, 
for  the  most  part  professors  have  to  look  for  ethical  guidance  in  the  general  professional  or 
institutional  norms  of  academic  integrity  (honesty,  accuracy,  fairness,  collegiality,  etc.)  that  they 
learned during their graduate studies, and through trial and error as they became integrated into their  
respective academic institutions. Yet, views about “the role of the academy” in society and that of 
professors are increasingly contested, especially in a context where professors are more than ever 
encouraged  to  develop  and  transfer  their  knowledge  or  do  research  that  can  be  translated  into 
commercializable products [1,2]. In the Canadian context, there are a diversity of relevant policies and 
guidelines that provide a normative framework for professors – e.g., institutional policies on academic 
integrity/misconduct [3] and conflicts of interest [4], and national guidelines on research ethics [5] and 
academic  integrity  [6]  –  but  this  guidance  may  be  incomplete,  insufficient,  hard  to  access,  and 
sometimes even contradictory. And this is particular the case for conflicts of interest (COI).
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In discussions about COI and university professors, we generally think of the issue as being: 1) a 
problem of academic misconduct, and 2) something that involves financial interests associated with 
biomedical or applied sciences research. That is, we are mostly sensitive to situations involving the 
clinician-researcher working on a clinical drug trial sponsored by a pharmaceutical company who is 
paid for each patient recruited onto the study [7]; or the professor who develops a new technology, 
launches a start-up company and then devotes more time to growing the company at the expense of 
other professorial  responsibilities [8]; or the Dean who negotiates a large corporate donation to a 
research centre in their Faculty, with the implicit expectation that influence will be brought to bear to 
“encourage” the hiring of certain professors and not others [9,10]. Such high profile cases have lead 
most universities in North America to adopt strict COI policies and procedures to limit the negative 
consequences of such major financial (and some non-financial) interests on academic behaviour [11]. 
The problem, however, is that these measures give the impression that most if not all problematic COI 
are financial, and that they are the result of corruption and misconduct by “a few bad apples” [12].  
Conflict of interest is thus considered bad by definition, and so should  always be avoided; i.e., the 
best approach is through the implementation and respect of “zero tolerance” policies and procedures. 
But this is simply not the case. 
A COI, in its broad sense, can be defined as “a situation in which a person has a private or personal  
interest sufficient to appear to influence the objective exercise of his or her official duties as, say, a 
public  official,  an employee,  or  a professional”  [13, p.68].  These factors include not only  financial 
interests,  but  also the full  range  of  personal  factors that  can affect  judgment  or  objectivity  (e.g., 
personal pride, prestige, competitiveness) [14]. In the context of university research, a COI can arise 
with “any factor that might tend to undermine a competent researcher’s ability to make scientifically  
reliable  judgments  concerning  research  strategy,  evidence  or  conclusions”  [15,  p.52].  Further,  a 
determination of whether there is a COI should not be seen as a black or white factual – “yes there is, 
no there is not” – decision. Not only would such a determination be difficult, and likely very subjective, 
it  would  also set  the threshold for  determining COI  very high and so make the concept  hard  to 
operationalise. 
Following Resnik  [16],  a more useful  definition of COI would focus on 1) determining the risk or 
probability of there being a COI given the interests at stake, and 2) distinguishing between those COI 
that are real (actual)  or apparent. A professor,  then, has a real COI “if  and only if  he or she  has 
personal, financial, professional, or political interests that have a significant chance of compromising 
the judgment of the average [professor] in the conduct of research [or other professional activities]” 
[16, p.111], which is distinct from an apparent COI, which would be the case “if and only if he or she 
has personal, financial, professional, or political interests that appear to the average outside observer 
to have a significant chance of compromising the judgment of the average [professor] in the conduct 
of research [or other professional activities]” [16, p.112].1 The most obvious COI occur in situations 
where professors have financial or personal interests that are likely to influence the objective exercise 
of their official duties, either as contributors to the shared body of knowledge or as educators [11]. Of 
particular concern are those COI resulting from the private funding of research, whether this be in the 
form of research contracts, external consulting activities, or participation in joint-ventures [17-19].
Despite the fact that COI can be defined as a “potential for alteration” of the professor’s judgment in 
particular  situations,  they  are  not  inherently  unethical,  nor  something  that  should  be  considered 
synonymous with academic misconduct, even if they do sometimes lead to unethical behaviour [12]. 
The institutional context of the university makes many COI likely, even inevitable, and they may be 
unintentional and unconscious.  In this paper, I explore a diversity of largely ignored COI – which I 
have  grouped  into  financial,  non-financial and  institutional COI  –  that  arise  in  the  normal  daily 
activities of a university professor – i.e., myself. While some COI will be sufficiently problematic (i.e.,  
1 Thanks to David Resnik for pointing out the need for this clarification and providing an excellent source!
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significant risk of harm to students, colleagues, individual or institutional reputations) to necessitate 
changes to institutional structures (e.g., implementation of policies restricting certain interests), I will 
reflect specifically on how those COI that are often unavoidable can and should be managed, and 
generally without recourse to the “heavy artillery” of COI policies.
Financial Interests
A professor in the Bioethics Programme of the Department of Social and Preventive Medicine at the 
Université  de  Montréal,  my research  focuses on issues in  health  innovation,  professional  ethics, 
scientific integrity and the management of conflicts of interest. As such, I will never receive patient  
recruitment fees for a clinical trial  or launch a new technology spin-off  company. Nonetheless, my 
research  expertise  has  led  me  to  be  solicited  for  and  engage  in  paid  extramural  activities.  For 
example, I have done occasional paid consulting contracts for government agencies (e.g., Genome 
Canada  and  Health  Canada),  have  received  modest  honoraria  for  sitting  on  expert  advisory 
committees (e.g., Genome Quebec), and also received honoraria and had my travel expenses paid 
(with very nice hotels) to give invited presentations at conferences or workshops in exotic locations 
such as China, South Korea and Red Deer Alberta! The amounts of money involved – ranging from a 
few hundred dollars to a few thousand – are still very welcome, as too is the opportunity to travel 
internationally. Clearly these incentives were a small but non-negligible interest that weighed in my 
evaluation of whether or not to engage in the different activities. This raises a challenging issue, in my 
mind, namely conflict of commitment, “the umbrella term for issues centering on the allocation of time 
and energy to fulfill three primary academic roles: teaching, research, and public service” [20, p.360].
As  many  an economist  or  business  person  would  agree,  “time  is  money”.  As  a  busy  university  
professor my “free time” is rather limited, and so for me this time is worth a substantial but completely  
arbitrary amount of money. I have only one or two days free per 7 day week where I can get to my 
own  research  and  writing,  the  rest  being  taken  up  by  teaching,  supervision  or  administrative 
responsibilities; so the financial or other incentives required for me to part with my free time are thus 
relatively high. Why would I want to spend that time working for someone else? It is not as if I need 
the money, given that I have a good salary and benefits. But if the interest of a contract or paid trip is  
non-negligible  and  also  aligns  with  my  research  and  publication  interests  and  activities,  then  it 
becomes an opportunity worth considering.
The standard mechanisms proposed for dealing with these types of financial COI include:
1) Financial  thresholds,  such  as  the  US  National  Institutes  of  Health  (NIH)  policy  requiring 
federally funded researchers to disclose contracts or fees of more than $5,000, although this 
does not mean that they will be prohibited [21]. But such disclosure thresholds have obvious 
problems because even $1,500 could be a potentially problematic interest for some professors 
at some point in time (e.g., a junior professor with a lower salary and substantial debts) and so 
warrant disclosure, whereas $10,000 for a wealthy senior professor may not be problematic for 
that individual…while a $100 bottle of wine to a connoisseur could be problematic regardless 
of their salary! Does the disclosure of only some financial interests necessarily mean that the 
COI  has  been  managed? Cleary  disclosure  can  only  be  the  first  step  in  a  management 
process. But how (what criterion) is a third party,  e.g.,  my Head of Department, to decide 
whether  my  receiving  a  $1,500  honorarium  for  an  invited  presentation  constituted  a 
problematic COI, and if so, determine an appropriate management strategy?
2) Prohibitions, against “free pens” or paid travel/speaking engagements from the pharmaceutical 
industry,  because  they  are  effective  means  of  generating  unconscious  positive  influence 
[22,23]. But why focus just on Big Pharma, even if their marketing and influence have been 
notably  problematic  in  medicine?  Surely  other  industries  or  for-profit/not-for-profit 
ISSN 1923-2799 4 / 18
B Williams-Jones BioéthiqueOnline 2013, 2/4
(http://bioethiqueonline.ca/2/4)
organisations that give away free pens (government agencies, professional organisations) or 
who pay for travel are trying to influence certain behaviour or create positive feeling on the part 
of professors? Would the free pen, travel to the capital city and a nice dinner be acceptable  
when coming from a federal  funding agency (but  not  industry?)  for  sitting  on a  volunteer 
scholarship review committee? Clearly these “gifts” are part of the funder’s publicity campaign, 
aimed at both recognising my participation in an activity that demands a great deal of time and 
work, and also creating a positive influence, i.e., to entice me to continue participating in such 
volunteer academic activities.
3) Disclosure,  such as  mandatory  annual  declarations  or  posting  on  institutional  websites  of 
faculty COI to promote transparency [24]. Again, we have the problem of deciding on what  
types of financial COI to declare (financial  threshold), but also how and in what form they 
should be presented (e.g., internal to the institution or public). What if people do not declare or 
even do not  know that  they  are or  might  be in  a COI  that  should be declared? And just 
because the interest is disclosed does not mean that its influence has been eliminated and 
that the COI is managed [25-27].
Thinking in terms of influence, “but for” the financial incentive, there are many activities I would not 
have taken up; but does that put me in a problematic conflict of commitment that then also affected 
my professional judgment or objectivity, and so become a COI? Many universities have policies or 
practices (often not formally codified) that permit some level of outside activities (e.g., consulting) on 
the part  of  professors.  This  may be an implicit  recognition that  professors are actually  underpaid 
relative to their education (e.g., when compared to the private sector or civil service), or simply an 
acknowledgement that as they likely work much more than 40 hours/week (more like 60-80 hours), 
professors have earned some flexibility in how they manage their time. But this very flexibility can 
become problematic if external financial incentives led me to spend more than the 1 day/week “do 
what  you want”  consulting rule  common in  many universities and so neglect  my other  academic 
responsibilities  (a  conflict  of  commitment),  and/or  prioritise  the interests  of  those for  whom I  am 
consulting over my responsibilities as a professor (a COI). 
More diffuse is the general pressure on professors to perform in order to progress their career and 
obtain  higher  salaries,  even when there are  no financial  performance bonuses.  Recognising that 
“what really counts” for promotion is grants and publications, there is every interest in spending one’s 
time  on  research,  publications  and  grant  writing,  to  the  detriment  of  teaching,  supervision  or 
collegiality  (participation on various departmental  or  faculty  committees).  Here,  then,  the  financial 
interest is in obtaining a better salary and more grant funds, and the conflict is that this interest skews 
behaviour towards a subset of a professor’s academic responsibilities (and judgment about which are 
important) at the expense of others (e.g., students’ interests) [20,28].
My own experience with the management of these financial interests has made it clear that formal 
annual disclosure policies that require filling in a form are a very limited part of the solution, especially  
when there is no subsequent plan for managing the situation. Instead, what has helped me to address 
these COI has been self-awareness of my own interests and reflection about how these interests can 
conflict  with  my  other  responsibilities.  For  example,  in  accepting  paid  travel  to  an  interesting 
destination, or a consulting contract to perform a particular research project, I ask myself the following 
questions: Does this activity align with my current research interests? Is it going to distract me from 
my other responsibilities? Do I have time? How can it benefit my students or colleagues (e.g., funding 
for students, network)? And when uncertain of the answer to one of these questions, I consult my 
colleagues. This self-questioning necessitates a significant degree of reflexivity – even brutal  self-
honesty – and the humility to share one’s concerns and seek advice from colleagues in order to see 
whether a particular COI is problematic, and if so, determine how it can be best managed. It also 
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requires recognising that some interests are especially problematic, may be hard to identify through 
reflexivity (its very hard to admit, as a professor, that one may be biased!), and so should be avoided 
or even prohibited.
Non-Financial Interests
From my perspective, the COI that I find the most challenging to manage in practice – and thus the 
most intellectually interesting to reflect upon – are those that are non-financial and have to do with 
human interactions and relationships. As a university professor, most of my time is spent engaging 
with various people in diverse contexts (e.g., students, other professors, administrators, support staff), 
and as such I am regularly implicated in a diversity of COI that are more or less problematic. In this  
section, I will focus on three types of relationship: 1) professor-student, 2) professor-professor, and 3) 
professor-institution.
1) Professor-Student Relationship
My teaching is all done in the context of a graduate programme, so it is often the case that students 
taking my courses are also ones who I supervise for their Masters or PhD projects. As such, this 
creates an important COI that has implications for both the student in question, the class as a whole, 
and the trust they have in me as their teacher/supervisor. I invariably know “my graduate students”  
much better than the other students in my class, so there is a potential to be biased (e.g., be more 
generous) in my evaluation of their assignments as opposed to those of the rest of the class. Because 
I am aware of this potential for positive bias, I might also be overly severe in evaluating my own 
students’ work, “over correcting” as it were and thus unfair in comparison with my evaluations of the 
work of their fellow students, because “I know my student can do better!” This type of COI can be 
thought  of  as  being  at  one  end  (i.e.,  least  problematic)  of  a  spectrum  of  professor-student 
relationships.
More problematic is the situation – which I  have had recounted to me by colleagues –  where a 
student in the class is in a close personal relationship with the professor (e.g., child, spouse). In this 
case, it  is appropriate that the professor not grade the student to avoid all real or perceived bias;  
better yet would be for the student not to take the professor’s course, thereby avoiding all appearance 
of  COI.  Similarly,  in  the case where the student  is  the child  of  a  colleague or  a neighbour,  and 
especially where there is a longstanding relationship (e.g., having watched the child grow up), it would 
make sense for this student to be evaluated by another colleague or teaching assistant. 
In both cases,  however,  there is a need for  a case by case analysis and an intervention that  is  
proportionate to the risk. To prohibit, without exception, the participation in a course of students who 
have a close personal relation with the professor could unduly penalise some students, especially 
when the course is obligatory and no alternative courses are available. In a large class setting, where 
there are teaching assistants, it is possible to have the student graded by someone not in a close 
personal relation, although effort will still have to be made to ensure that there is no favouritism on the 
part of the grader towards a student they know to be in a close relation with the professor. But as in  
my  previous  example  about  having  students  in  my  graduate  seminars,  it  becomes  far  more 
challenging when there is only one evaluator (the professor) and a small cohort of students. Overall, I  
would suggest that the perception of partiality may be less problematic than the pressure that the 
professor  might  feel  to  be  more  favourable  towards  this  student  (i.e.,  to  be  nice  or  not  overly 
demanding to the child of friend/colleague), regardless of whether there are any actual pressures from 
the friend or colleague.
At the other end of the spectrum of problematic cases are romantic relationships between students 
and professors. Even if the relationship is fully consensual between two adults, the power imbalance 
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will be such that other students or colleagues will invariably question whether the professor abused 
their position of authority  to seduce the student,  even if  in  fact it  were the reverse situation [29]. 
Moreover, there may be a breach of confidence that jeopardises the trusting relationship that should 
exist between a professor and their graduate student. A romantic interest, I would argue, undermines 
the professor’s  ability  to  actualise  their  fiduciary responsibility  to  work  in  the best  academic and 
professional interests of their student, as would also be the case for financial COI (e.g., the student 
also  works  in  the  professor’s  spin-off  company).  The  risk  of  biased  judgment  –  not  to  mention 
accusations of sexual harassment – and the associated loss of credibility and trust on the part of the 
class and colleagues (and towards the Institution) is simply too high to be permitted [30].
Most  institutions  would  rightly  condemn – and even  punish as  academic  misconduct  –  romantic 
relationships between professors and undergraduate students, because of the power differential (if 
not necessarily also an age difference) and the very negative perception of bias on the part of other 
students and colleagues [31,32]. More challenging is the case with graduate students, who tend to be 
older and more mature (many of my graduate students are my age or older), and who can develop 
close and long term working relationships with their  supervisors that  sometimes lead to romantic 
feelings. Should a consensual romantic relationship develop during the course of a supervision, a 
reasonable solution would be for the student to change directors, and for the now former supervisor to 
avoid evaluating the student in all other context (juries, scholarship competitions); nonetheless, the 
appearance of COI may still be very hard to eliminate [33]. I would thus take the strong position that  
professors should avoid if at all possible  teaching, and never supervise, graduate students with whom 
they have a close personal relationship (e.g., filial, romantic, or business).
But  to return to the initial  and arguably less problematic  but  more common case of my teaching 
graduate students who I also supervise, it would be impractical – and probably unwarranted given the 
level of risk of bias – to require me to not grade these students. In practice, this would mean asking 
other professors to grade students in a course that they do not teach, adding a responsibility that is 
normally assumed only in cases of student misconduct (e.g., plagiarism) or a disagreement on a final 
evaluation.  One possibility  might  be to use evaluations  that  a  blinded  review procedure,  so  that 
students identities are hidden during the evaluation  process (e.g.,  stripping of  identifiers  such as 
name, ID number, etc.). While this could certainly work minimizing a risk of bias in the context of 
written exams, it  would be much less practical for essays because I will  likely know the student’s 
research  interests  and  writing  style,  and  impossible  for  in-class  presentations.  These  last  two 
evaluation mechanisms are commonly used in the humanities and many social sciences, and ones 
that I invariably use in my graduate courses. My management approach has thus been to make a 
conscious effort to be as fair as possible in my evaluations, recognising my own bias towards being 
either overly generous and/or more demanding of the students I supervise. 
Given the significant academic liberty that professors have in the design and conduct of their courses 
(and thus confidence in their judgment), as well as the substantial subjectivity in evaluating written 
work,  self-awareness  and  experience  are  likely  the  best  management  approach  when  it  is  not 
possible to blind the work or have it evaluated by a third party. But transparency is also important to 
building and maintaining trust in the face of actual and unavoidable COI. So in these situations, I 
discuss the COI with my class at the beginning of term. Disclosure becomes “a teaching moment” or  
pedagogical tool to help introduce students to the notion of COI in general, and the risks or harms that 
need to be avoided (e.g., positive or negative bias, favouritism), and justice and equity in student 
evaluation  (e.g.,  merit  vs.  egalitarianism)  that  can be  compromised  when COI  are  not  managed 
appropriately.
Besides teaching or graduate supervision, there are many other situations in the professor-student 
relationship  that  regularly  put  professors  (including  myself)  and  their  students  in  potentially 
problematic and often unavoidable COI [28]. 
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Publications
Unlike some disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, in the applied and health sciences – 
and for my purposes, in bioethics – it is both possible and valorised to co-author papers with students.  
The obvious positive aspect is that this helps students learn how to write and publish, and to build 
their  academic  experience,  credibility,  and  confidence.  Co-authoring  also  benefits  professors  by 
allowing them to produce many more publications per year than if they were publishing alone; but for 
my student co-authors, I would be unable to publish the 5-7 articles per year that are considered a 
“normal” publication record for a tenured professor. Given the very real pressure on professors to 
“publish or perish”, this could lead to important COI. A professor might push a student to spend an 
unreasonable amount of time on a manuscript to get it into the top journal, at the expense of the 
student’s  other activities/interests,  namely completing  their  thesis  in  a timely fashion,  a case I’ve 
frequently heard from graduates students in the health and applied sciences. Or the professor might 
pressure the student to be named on all papers in the thesis, regardless of the professor’s actual level 
of contribution, something that is also very common in the applied sciences. Less overtly problematic,  
but equally sensitive, is the challenge of equitably allocating authorship in team publications, where 
the professor and students may all have interests in being first author, and where (inter)disciplinary 
norms may be missing or conflictual [34]. The issue of publication authorship can lead to COI when 
trying  to  determine  who  should  be  first  author  (and  the  order  of  other  authors):  myself  as  the 
researcher and professor who’s sometimes also paying the students as research assistants, or one of 
the students who “needs the publication more” than I do, regardless of their actually contribution? My 
solution  has  been  to  discuss,  from  the  beginning  and  at  different  moments  during  any  writing 
collaboration with my students and research teams, the issue of authorship [34]. I make it clear that  
author order is always up for re-negotiation as the work proceeds and will depend on a person’s level 
of involvement; the first author is the person who drafts the paper and “runs the project”, and that is 
rarely me because of my lack of time, thus my interest in co-authorship. Nor do I assume nor require  
that I be a co-author on every paper – even if in practice I often am named on the paper – included in 
my graduate student’s thesis.
Research Assistants
In  conducting  my  research  and  in  publishing,  I  invariably  work  with  a  small  team  of  research 
assistants (RA), some of whom I also supervise. This is a direct benefit to me because it brings in  
extra expertise and support to advance the project, benefits students who get research experience 
and funding, and allows me to publish at a higher rate (more collaborative publications). But how 
should I choose who to hire as an RA? Can I legitimately favour my own students who I know well, am 
responsible for and have an interest in seeing financially supported and advancing in their careers? 
What about other graduate students, who are equally in need of funding and research experience, but 
are not part of a research team; do they not also deserve a chance (an issue of equity, and not a  
COI)? Finally, in hiring students as RAs, there is a clear change in the power relation and in our 
respective roles, because I am paying their salaries; they are students but also employees, and I am a 
supervisor but  also an employer [28].  There is pressure for them to perform and concentrate on 
advancing my research agenda, but at the same time I am also interested in their success and so that 
could lead me to be at times too lenient (e.g., with regards to their other commitments/interests, or  
author order on publications) and so undermine the timely work on the project, and thus the interest of  
funders in seeing the project completed.
The numerous and diverse interests that arise when hiring an RA (whether their thesis is supervised 
by me or not) can and often do conflict. At the heart is an issue of trust, both with regards to the  
student with whom I work and to the funding agency (and thus the broader society) that financially 
supports  my  research.  I  honestly  choose  to  “play  favourites”  and  so  select  the  best  students  I 
encounter in my teaching, and preferentially those who I have already agreed to supervise for their 
Masters or PhD theses. In this way, I support those students to whom I have a direct obligation (e.g., 
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supervision,  mentoring,  financial  support  where possible),  who I  know to be competent,  and with 
whom I am able to work effectively; and in so doing, I also am more likely to succeed in my research 
activities  and  thus  meet  my  obligations  to  research  funders.  As  with  issues  of  supervision  and 
authorship,  the  inevitable  COI  between  my and the RA’s  interest  in  publishing,  gaining research 
experience, and also meeting the interests and demands of my research project are managed through 
regular and open dialogue. But it is also important to recognise that my priorities and those of my 
students will diverge at times, at which point it becomes a question of negotiating tasks and timelines, 
sometimes  finding  other  personnel,  or  accepting  a  slower  or  different  productivity  than  initially 
planned. In my experience, this is invariably the nature of research projects, where the plan we start 
with  may  not  be  the  one  we complete;  the  inevitable  COI  are  thus  managed through  dialogue, 
compromise and adaptation, and the result is still excellent productivity.
Letters of Reference
Professors are regularly solicited to write reference letters for their students, primarily for scholarship 
applications, but also eventually for jobs. Given my positive regard towards my students, and my real 
interest in seeing them succeed – it is personally very rewarding, but also reflects well on my own 
academic prestige – how objective can I really be? What should I do when I have multiple students 
asking for letters for the same competition; should I accept to write all letters, as strong as possible for  
each, or only accept to write a letter for the “first through the door”? Should I accept to write letters for  
students who I do not think are strong enough “just to be nice” or to not discourage them? [35,36]
My approach has been both self-interested and honest: for students who I do not think strong enough 
for a competition, or who I do not know well enough, I tell them that I cannot write them a strong 
enough letter, and discuss where I think their weaknesses are and how these can be improved. I do 
not  waste my time writing weak letters that  will  actually hinder a student’s application.  For those 
students who are strong and whom I know well (even if I am not their supervisor), I accept to write  
them all letters, even if they are competing for the same scholarship, and make it clear to all that I will  
write the strongest letter possible. The management of this COI is through transparency, but also 
reflexivity, as I try to be as honest as possible about each student’s strengths and weaknesses while 
also writing the best possible letter.
In  an  attempt  to  mitigate  the  inherent  favourable  bias  in  letters  of  reference,  some  institutions 
(departments  or  funding  agencies)  have  moved  towards  requesting  numerical  or  grade  based 
evaluations instead of written letters of reference. But these are, to my mind, no less subjective than 
the  traditional  letter  where  I  enumerate  the  excellence  and  diverse  skill  sets  of  my  students, 
particularly  in  a  field where multiple  competencies are  required [37].  Through my students,  I  am 
clearly  competing  with  other  colleagues  who  are  also  promoting  their  students’  interests  in 
succeeding. In a sense, then, there may be a market competition at work such that the best student 
dossier  (grades,  project  proposal,  letters  of  reference) wins out,  thus eliminating  (minimizing) the 
problem of bias; i.e., if all professors write strong but honest letters of reference. However, in a context 
of  grade inflation  and pressure towards hyperbole in  reference letters,  if  professors let  their  own 
interest in their student’s success lead them to unreasonably promote less competitive students, this 
market analogy fails and difficult COI remain.
Perhaps even more challenging is the case of the extremely productive student who also has some 
personality  conflicts.  Knowing  that  my  letter  of  reference  is  an  important  part  of  an  application 
package (e.g., for a scholarship, a job), do I leave out certain weaknesses such as the fact that the 
student can sometimes be “difficult” in a team setting, or even avoid all reference to collegiality, and 
instead play  up  their  excellent  publication  record  because the truth  would  not  be  an  unqualified 
recommendation? The conflict  is  thus between being honest and providing the information that  a 
reviewer (i.e., a fellow colleague, or even myself as a reviewer) would want to know, and wanting the 
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reviewer to positively evaluate my student. The reality is that some letters a professor must accept,  
and they will be very hard to write; the tension cannot be evacuated from the situation, and so the 
professor may remain genuinely conflicted about what is the objective truth and whether they should 
express it in a letter of reference.2
Aside from completely eliminating letters and simply relying on student CVs (which raise their own 
problems with objectivity and “padding” or inflation), guidance for addressing the COI raised in the 
context of letters of reference will likely be found in norms of academic integrity and collegiality (which 
have obvious limitations), to some extent in professional self-interest in avoiding a potential loss of 
credibility should the professor gain a reputation for promoting mediocre students. But it will also be 
important  for  the  professor  to  be  honest  and  to  try  to  write  the  strongest  letter  possible,  while 
recognising that  they will  have to grapple with difficult  questions to which there may be no clear 
solution.
Scholarships
At the level of granting agencies, it is obvious and practical to require that supervisors not judge their  
own students in scholarship competitions; i.e., professors recuse themselves from the review process 
(the do not evaluate their own students) and often even leave the meeting while the candidate is 
being evaluated, so as not to bias or even give the appearance of biasing the discussion and decision 
making. There are invariably sufficient committee members present to ensure that all students are 
fairly evaluated when one member of the committee has to leave because of a COI; and the risk to 
the  credibility  of  the  funding agency is  far  too  great  to  permit  even the appearance  of  COI.  By  
contrast, the management of COI in internal institutional scholarship programmes can be much more 
problematic.  Whether as part of  a responsibility in my graduate programme, or through my active 
involvement in various research centres, I am regularly called upon to evaluate student dossiers for 
scholarship competitions, and often I find myself evaluating and ranking my own graduate students, or 
students who I have taught. But were we to apply the rule of the large funding agencies, there might 
simply not be enough professors around the table to do the evaluation…and often many members of 
the jury have their students in the competition!
An alternative would be to remove this responsibility for evaluating scholarships from programmes or 
departments and place it within the hands of a more distant body, such as the Faculty of Graduate 
Studies. But then, in essence, this would require replicating internally the structure of the funding 
agencies,  and  thus  necessitate  the  constitution  of  review  panels  with  the  requisite 
subject/discipline/methodological expertise to fairly judge the dossiers; the solution to the COI is thus 
very costly in terms of time and personnel, and probably impractical. In practice, what we often see is  
local (centre, department) evaluation, where professor COI is managed but not eliminated through 
transparency (declaration) and a balancing of interests through competition. Committee members try 
to evaluate, as best as possible, the candidates in hand while being clear about their own interest 
(their own students’ success) in face of the interest of their colleagues. Alternatively, professors could 
refuse to write reference letters for competitions on which they will be evaluators. But this would then 
put their students at a competitive disadvantage – compared with students’ whose supervisors are not 
on  the  scholarship  committee  –  in  presenting  the  best  possible  application,  something  that  is  
particularly problematic in small programmes (my situation) where it may already be difficult to obtain 
strong letters of reference because there are only a few professors who teach most of the courses.
My own career  advancement  benefits  when my students graduate  and succeed,  so  a  pervasive 
interest – and thus COI – arises from my professional relationship with my students. I might over-
promote them beyond what they are actually capable of accomplishing, or may help them too much in 
their research and publication activities. But I also have a responsibility as a professor – whether as 
2 Thanks to Daylian Cain for sharing this excellent – and challenging – example!
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supervisor or teacher – to help my students acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to progress in 
their studies and chosen career paths. The management of the aforementioned COI is thus – as in  
the case of letters of reference, or scholarships – an issue of academic integrity on my part, and 
requires self-awareness and honesty about my own interests. In some cases, it can be possible to 
include other expert evaluators to form the scholarship committee (something we have done in my 
Programme  on  occasion),  and  thus  eliminate  the  need  for  professors  who  are  also  supervising 
candidates to participate in the jury. But this will not always be possible. As such, the issue of internal 
scholarships  and fair  evaluation  procedures  should  be a subject  for  ongoing discussion amongst 
colleagues (e.g., to identify best practices and procedures). In the context of specific juries, professors 
must disclose their own interests, and discuss those of the students and colleagues involved, in order 
to help ensure that awareness of our respective interests leads to fair and honest evaluations, and the 
maintenance of professional and collegial relationships.
2) Professor-Professor Relationship
The academic environment is a competitive one, and it  is  likely  impossible to succeed without  a 
healthy dose of professional ambition. Even in the Canadian context, where professors have relatively 
good salaries and access to grant funding through provincial and federal funding agencies, there may 
be competition that could result in COI. The most obvious COI (whether financial or non-financial) 
arise in the context of peer-review, whether for grants or in publications, and these are invariably 
managed, if imperfectly, through disclosure mechanisms [27]. This obviously requires honesty on the 
part of a reviewer to disclose an interest, whether favourable or not, with regards to the submission of 
a colleague, friend or competitor/adversary. Evaluating a grant application or peer-reviewing an article 
takes substantial time and energy, is invariably volunteer work, and while important to the functioning 
of the academic community, is not highly valued in promotion. So an important factor supporting the 
effectiveness of the COI disclosure mechanism is that it can give busy professors who are in a COI an 
easy way to get out of work that they might otherwise feel obliged to accept!
The downside of not evaluating a paper or grant due to COI can be the problem of expertise, which is  
particularly challenging in very specialised areas of research where all the researchers know each 
other. Blinding of the review process may work in large fields, but becomes completely impractical in 
other areas, such as for scholars working in bioethics in Quebec and English Canada; the community 
is simply too small. So for example, in the journal BioéthiqueOnline of which I am Editor-in-Chief, we 
have opted for a policy of full transparency in our evaluation process (i.e., authors, editors and peer  
reviewers are clearly identified during the full review process and named on the final publication), and 
disclosure of all  COI on the website and on individual publications.  We accept that students and 
colleagues will sometimes be in COI regarding the evaluation of manuscripts – we invariably know 
each other well, having worked together – and so declare these interests so the reader can evaluate 
whether they biased the quality of the work published in our journal. 
In my experience, much more problematic and harder to manage are the professor-professor relations 
that  have  to  do  with  teaching  and  administrative  responsibilities,  collaborative  opportunities, 
competition for limited resources, and ambition to succeed and be respected by one’s peers. Some of  
these may be simply issues of professional integrity and collegiality, but others can lead to important  
and very problematic COI.
Workload
Having recently received tenure in 2010, I still very well remember the experience of being a new and 
junior  colleague in  my department.  In  research universities,  junior  professors are  often protected 
during  their  first  few  years  from  assuming  too  many  administrative  or  teaching  responsibilities, 
because  they  should  be  working  to  both  build  their  courses  and  establish  their  research  and 
publication records, with a view to contract renewal (after 2-3 years) and eventual tenure application.  
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In practice, though, the arrival of “the new kid” in a department can be an opportunity for more senior 
colleagues to download responsibility for courses they no longer wish to teach, or participation on 
committees that they find uninteresting or time consuming. At the same time, junior colleagues may 
not know the departmental history or politics, feel ill-placed to “say no” to “requests” from colleagues, 
or simply be poorly placed to judge the “good learning experience” of sitting on a particular committee. 
Often this  is  also an issue of  being presented with  too many good opportunities  (i.e.,  too many 
interests) – this was certainly my experience in the first few years – and being unable to judge which 
ones are worth the investment and which opportunities are too costly in terms of time, energy and  
stress. There are many conflicting interests pulling a professor in different directions, and sometimes 
these  become COI  when  junior  professors  feel  pressured  (whether  or  not  intentional)  to  accept 
responsibilities that they would otherwise not, if they were being more self-interested.
A challenge for directors of departments, and colleagues more generally, is to ensure an equitable 
distribution of teaching and administrative responsibilities, while also recognising that colleagues will 
have different interests depending on where they may be along their respective career trajectories. 
The solution is, first, a recognition that junior colleagues are particularly vulnerable in the early stages 
of their  careers, and so their  interests should be favoured over those of  more senior colleagues,  
especially when these conflict  (something that could be recognised in departmental  procedures or 
even  collective  agreements).  The  corollary  could  be  formal  or  informal  mentoring  arrangements, 
which I have seen in a colleague’s department, where a more senior colleague is paired with a junior 
colleague to guide them through their introduction into “the academic game”, teach them how and 
when “to say no”, and so be able to better recognise and manage the diversity of interests – some of 
which will conflict – that are part of the life of a professor. In so doing, departmental colleagues also 
explicitly recognise that those who are more senior may be in real COI (whether or not intentional) 
with regards to the attribution of academic responsibilities to/by their junior colleagues.
Research opportunities
Similar  to  the  case  with  students,  professors  may  be  inclined  to  favour  their  friends  over  other 
colleagues (and even marginalise adversaries) when it  comes to building research teams, inviting 
colleagues to be part of research networks, or collaborating in multi-authored publications. Now many 
of these choices might be considered reasonable, even prudent, and not a COI. Professors are not 
forced to work with each other,  and it  would  be foolhardy  to collaborate with someone who one 
disliked and distrusted; professors can, one might argue, always work on other projects and build their 
own teams and networks. Yet, I have seen junior colleagues systematically excluded from groups or 
networks,  and  had  serious  impediments  placed  in  their  paths  that  even  jeopardised  career 
advancement  (promotion,  tenure,  etc.).  The  contrary  is  also  the  case,  where  promising  junior 
professors are solicited by senior colleagues to participate in large research teams or networks in 
order to expand the ranks of productive CVs, but also out of an honest desire to collaborate with the 
best (new) researchers in the field. As in the case of administrative or departmental responsibilities, 
junior professors may inappropriately weigh the prestige and “honour” of being invited to join a high 
profile team, against the work involved (committee meetings, reports), the actual resources provided 
(less money than promised), or the loss of time to focus on their own research and publications. In 
some very specialised fields, what might normally be productive competition can become vicious and 
mean spirited, and when some of the parties involved are in positions of power with regards to grant 
funding or promotion, there can be cases of serious academic misconduct, including COI.
In these cases, formal policies or regulatory mechanisms addressing academic integrity/misconduct 
and COI will likely be of only limited utility, because the threshold (and cost to those actors involved) 
necessary to invoke these mechanisms will  be too high in all  but the most  extreme cases. More 
effective  is  the  lived experience  of  professors  who have gone through  or  witnessed problematic 
situations. By sharing such experiences with other colleagues, particularly those at the beginning of 
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their academic careers – whether they are still graduate students or junior professors – it becomes 
possible to name and so identify the interests at stake and the cases where they create problematic 
COI. Not to be ignored, however, is the power of a good or bad reputation and the view of one’s 
peers. Being forewarned by a senior colleague that a particular research team is either an abusive or 
an excellent environment is the sort of guidance that can both support a junior colleague and also 
mitigate some of the COI that are omnipresent in research.
3) Professor-Institution Relationship
University professors in Canada and in the US have enormous academic liberty and independence, 
both with regards to what and how they teach, and the subjects of their research. While I may have 
discussions with my colleagues and Head of Department about the courses needing to be taught in a 
given academic year, it is up to me alone to design my syllabus and decide on the most appropriate 
pedagogical  approach.  Similarly,  my choice of  research interests,  and what  grant  applications  or 
articles I decide to write, is a purely personal decision, even if I regularly receive helpful suggestions 
from  colleagues  and  research  collaborators.  My  relation  with  the  institution  –  that  is,  with  the 
Department of which I am a member, and with the University who is my employer – is one where I  
have substantial freedom. 
Nonetheless,  COI  can  arise  in  this  relation  when  certain  interests,  e.g.,  personal  ambition  in 
advancing my career,  are placed above those of  the institution,  whether it  be the Department or 
Faculty. The most obvious examples are conflicts of commitment, when professors do not “pull their 
weight” in teaching, graduate supervision or committee work, and as a result other colleagues are “left 
to pick up the slack”. Given our independence, as professors we may know little about how much 
work  our  colleagues  actually  do.  The  Head  of  Department  will  have  a  better  idea,  and  blatant  
examples are all too apparent, e.g., when colleagues are rarely present at departmental meetings or 
on committees. But it may be very difficult in practice to know which colleagues are working hard on 
all  aspects  of  the  profession  (teaching,  research,  administration,  public  service),  and  which  are 
focused primarily on one aspect, usually research. It is particularly hard to determine when a healthy 
professional ambition that supports a successful career path (something to be encouraged), becomes 
a self-centred interest that will conflict with the interests and objectives of the institution.
To be fair, while professors have a range of activities required of them, the important aspects for 
career progression – particularly in research-intensive universities – are invariably publication record 
and success with grant applications; teaching and administration, while expected and important for 
the good functioning of the institution, are much less valued by promotion committees. So professors, 
especially those who are not yet tenured, must regularly juggle with the pressure – and potentially  
conflicting interests – to on the one hand “publish or perish”, and on the other be a “good colleague”  
and participate on committees (administration),  while  also teaching their  courses and supervising 
graduate students. The flipside is that once tenured, a professor cannot be fired baring cases of gross 
misconduct; there may thus be a real interest to take it easy once a professor has tenure (e.g., more 
time consulting, absence from departmental committees, neglect in student supervision). In practice, 
this is likely rarely the case because the competitive work ethic and ambition necessary to obtain 
tenure becomes ingrained in the professor’s professional identity! And with this comes responsibilities 
and even an unconscious pressure to keep students involved in research and in publications (e.g., 
through co-authorship) and to keep research teams funded through competitive grant applications, 
which bring with them their own risk for COI.
Such conflicts of commitment and COI can often be managed through social or collegial mechanisms, 
such as the protection of junior colleagues from undue demands (as mentioned previously) or the 
indirect sanctioning of colleagues who do not do their share (e.g., placing them on necessary but 
unpleasant committees, or removing them from decision making contexts). Structurally, institutional 
ISSN 1923-2799 13 / 18
B Williams-Jones BioéthiqueOnline 2013, 2/4
(http://bioethiqueonline.ca/2/4)
changes could be made to valorise the full  range of activities required of  professors,  such as by 
ensuring that all aspects are weighed appropriately in promotion, or by providing certain benefits (e.g., 
teaching release)  for  those with  disproportionately  high administrative responsibilities  or  graduate 
supervision workload (something that is done in my department). Academic liberty and autonomy, 
while a cause of some problematic COI (e.g., ambition that leads to conscious and unconscious self-
interested behaviour and conflicts of commitment), can also be a strong protective factor because it 
can empower professors to “say no” to some demands of their institution (e.g., from the Department  
or  Faculty).  This  does not  mean that  clear  rules  are  not  necessary,  e.g.,  to  manage particularly 
problematic  financial/non-financial  COI  or  conflicts  of  commitment,  but  that  many  COI  will  be 
managed by reference to other principles or values (e.g., academic integrity).
Institutional Interests
As Director of the Bioethics Programme – a graduate programme with more than 70 students at the 
Masters and PhD – I have an additional administrative responsibility that most professors do not have, 
namely, an obligation to defend and lobby in the best interests of my Programme. Specifically, I work 
to promote the best  interests of  our students,  my colleagues and my field of  specialization.  In  a 
department with other graduate programmes and other specialties, there can be differences of opinion 
and even conflicting interests – if not actually COI – with regards to the importance of other fields of 
research or institutional priorities. This becomes particularly evident in a context of limited resources, 
both with regards to operational funds and the human resources needed to ensure my Programme’s 
good functioning. Along with the other programme directors, I may be competing to obtain sufficient 
funds to hire  sessional  lecturers or  teaching assistants for  my Programme’s courses.  Even more 
sensitive is the hiring of new professors, where vigorous and even acrimonious debate can occur 
about departmental priorities and the needs for particular areas of research and teaching. In these 
situations, there may be a direct conflict between my interest in and responsibility for the Bioethics 
Programme (i.e., ensuring that there are sufficient funds and personnel to meet our objectives), and 
the interests of my other colleagues, the other programmes, and the Department more generally, the 
result of which could be COI in some decision making contexts. 
As with the previous types of professor-relationship, many of these COI can be managed effectively 
through full disclosure and open dialogue. In departmental meetings or in discussions with the Head 
of Department, it becomes readily apparent what are my personal and my programme/institutional 
interests, and these get “put on the table” and so have to compete with the interest of my other 
colleagues. If I can mount a convincing case to my colleagues that my Programme’s interests should 
be prioritised, then the conflict – if there is one – is dealt with in a democratic fashion, and one that my 
colleagues should accept.  Problematic,  however, are those situations in  which professors are not 
clear about their interests (either to themselves or to colleagues), or worse yet, when backroom deals 
are made between members of a department and so the diversity of interests cannot compete in the 
open and on a level playing field; the decisions made by key actors in the department may be biased, 
leading to harm to certain actors (e.g., some programmes or professors are disadvantaged) and then 
a loss of trust on the part of department members and even other colleagues. These situations do 
occur,  but  in  a  department  with  a  strong  democratic  culture,  and  a  practice  of  discussing  and 
documenting  (in  minutes,  with  departmental  policies)  good  practice,  these  COI  can  be  better 
managed.
Conclusion
Conflicts of interest are receiving growing attention in the university context, but unfortunately, there is 
still an overwhelming pejorative perception of COI; they are too often seen as something equivalent to 
academic misconduct (and so to be avoided at all costs!), and as being primarily financial in nature  
[12]. This paper has aimed to show, in some detail and through a reflection on my own experiences as 
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a professor and director of a graduate programme, that COI are not only pervasive in the university, 
but that they are actually a normal part of the life of professors; while COI raise important concerns 
about bias and credibility of judgments, in many cases they are unavoidable. In large part, I suggest,  
COI  are  due  to  the  reasonable  and  unavoidable  ambition  of  professors  in  their  own  career 
development, and in that of their students, colleagues and department. The challenge, then, becomes 
one of  identifying those COI that  are problematic  – and in  making the implicit,  explicit  – and so 
avoiding COI when possible and when not, figuring out how to live with them while minimizing the risk 
(e.g., harm to personal or professional identity, trust, institutional reputation).
It  is  essential  to  attend  to  the  full  range  of  these  COI  –  financial,  non-financial,  or  institutional; 
intentional or unintentional – and to think about the appropriate policies, procedures, or guidelines to 
mitigate COI and manage them when they cannot be avoided. Yet, there are important limits to such 
“hard” mechanisms. Formal policies are essential to describing the “lay of the land”, to marking the 
boundaries for what is considered acceptable behaviour, and should be accompanied by procedures 
and training to deal with misconduct or unethical behaviour. It is through policies and procedures that 
an institution can make explicit those norms and values that are implicit, and often unarticulated, and 
so work towards developing and ethical culture for the institution. Nonetheless, most of the tools or 
approaches I have outlined in this paper – and which I have used myself – are “soft”; that is, they rely  
on individual integrity,  judgment,  self-awareness or reflexivity,  humility and collegiality [38].  This is 
because  most  of  the  COI  encountered  in  the  university  context  are  not  the  extreme cases  that 
unfortunately make the headlines, where the risks or harms are great, and so where formal rules and 
policies are clearly necessary.
The COI that  professors  regularly encounter – whether it  be in  writing letters of  reference,  or  in  
collaborating  with  students  or  colleagues  on  research  projects  –  are  important  and  need  to  be 
managed. But were we to implement rules or policies for all these cases, we would unduly tie the 
hands of professors and the costs would likely be higher than the risks we are trying to avoid; nor 
would such policies be sufficiently flexible or adaptive to respond to all possible scenarios. A much 
better approach, I argue, is to empower professors to recognise those COI that are “out of bounds” – 
the ones normally addressed in institutional COI policies – and also be able to identify and evaluate 
those that are pervasive and so need to be managed. This, then, means giving much great attention 
to education – educating the educators, as it were – and providing practical tools and guidance to deal 
with common but problematic situations. It means bringing COI out of the darkness and accepting that 
it  often  has  to  be  lived  with  and  managed,  but  never  ignored,  nor  systematically  dealt  with  as 
fraudulent practice. It also means being sufficiently humble to recognise our own limited objectivity 
[39], and being open to discussing with our colleagues and our students those COI that cannot be 
avoided, in order to find the most effective and appropriate means for their management.
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